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Free will, determinism and the “problem” of structure and agency in the 
social sciences  
 
Sociology does not need to choose between the great hypotheses which 
divide metaphysicians. It needs to embrace free will no more than 
determinism. All that it asks is that the principle of causality be applied to 
social phenomena (Durkheim 1966, 141). 
 
Causality...is not a cab, which one can have stopped at one’s pleasure; it is 
all or nothing (Weber 1970, 119) 
 
1. Structure and Agency  
 
The so-called “problem” of structure and agency has been dubbed “the central 
problem in social and political theory” (Carlsnaes 1992, 245). Charged with the task 
of explaining and understanding human behaviour, the social sciences are faced 
with the apparent dichotomy between individuals’ free agency and the social-
structural causation that bears upon them. Certain types of social inquiry are 
conventionally seen to be orientated more to one side of this dichotomy than the 
other. Classical social science of the Marxian and Durkheimian varieties proffer 
explanatory analyses in which individuals’ beliefs, desires, opportunities, and actions 
appear to be constrained or determined by causes emanating from the social system 
in which they are embedded. In sharp contrast, “interpretive” or “intentionalist” forms 
of social inquiry present a vision in which social order emerges from open, fluid and 
indeterminate rules, norms and conventions that are generated and maintained 
through individuals’ reflexive agency. In this portrayal, individuals “create society 
through contingent acts of freedom” (Alexander, quoted by Carlsnaes 1992, 255). 
 However, the default theoretical strategy nowadays is to seek to avoid both 
extremes. This is founded on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory (1984), and 
Roy Bhaskar’s (1989) critical realist “transformational model of social activity”.1 
________ 
 
1 For the purpose of this paper I categorise both theories as structurationist. I am aware that 
critical realists may balk at their theories being classified as “structurationist”. But I want to 
bracket the differences in order to focus on the shared ground. This consists essentially in the 
propositions that agents constitute and maintain social structure, and that social structure 
conditions and influences, but does not determine, agents’ choices, decisions and actions. The 
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These theories are grounded on the metaphysical postulation that the essential 
property of individuals’ agency is their ability to have acted differently to how they 
actually acted. As Giddens (1984, 9) puts it: “agency concerns events of which an 
individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a 
given sequence of conduct, have acted differently”.2 This conception of agency 
seems to place the individual beyond the reach of social-structural causation, but 
structurationist theory recognises a “conditioning” and “influencing” role for social 
structure.  
Even so, structurationists continue to argue over whether “either agency is 
privileged over structure, or structure over agency” (Carlsnaes 1992, 250), with 
critical realists insisting on the “ontological separateness” of “structure” and “agency”, 
against Giddens’s alleged “conflation” of them (Piiroinen 2014, 81-2). They also seek 
to know “whether or not particular social outcomes were the result of agential or 
structural forces” (Wight 2006, 243; Hay 2002, 113). Archer (1982, 459; also Bieler 
and Morton 2001, 9) even talks of “specify[ing] when there will be ‘more voluntarism’ 
or ‘more determinism’ ”. The task of addressing these questions is conceived 
metaphysically, as “essentially an ontological problem” (Wight 2006, 3). To the 
extent that these questions make sense, I will argue that they have to be taken as 
empirical and interpretive, not metaphysical or ontological, questions. 
The problem of structure and agency is often acknowledged by antagonists to 
have its roots in longstanding philosophical debates on the metaphysical question of 
free will (“voluntarism”) and determinism (Carlsnaes 1992, 245). In this paper I seek 
to show that, and how, familiarisation with the philosophical debates could bring 
________ 
 
generic term “structurationist” that I deploy henceforth is meant to highlight the similarities, 
without denying the differences. 
2 Cf. Giddens (1976, 75): “it is analytical to the concept of agency…that a person ‘could have 
acted otherwise’ ”; Bhaskar (1989, 114): “it is analytic to the concept of action that the agent 
could have acted otherwise”; Manicas (1996, 158): “it is analytic to the concept of action that 
the agent could have done otherwise”;* Lawson (1997, 9): “any individual could always have 
acted otherwise”; Hay (2002, 94): “the notion of agency implies…a sense of free will, choice 
or autonomy – that the actor could have behaved differently”; Hays (1994, 63): “the central 
point that is implied in all definitions of agency: alternative courses of action are available, and 
the agent therefore could have acted otherwise”; Fuchs (2001, 26): “humans have free wills; 
they can always do otherwise”.  
 
* Giddens, Bhaskar and some other structurationists conceive the ability to act otherwise as an 
analytic entailment of the concept action or agency, but it evidently is not. Frankfurt (1969) 
famously argued, to the satisfaction of many – but by no means all - philosophers, that an agent 
can act freely and responsibly even when they could not have acted otherwise.  
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much-needed clarity to the problem of structure and agency. However, this clarity 
issues in the dissolution of the problem as it is typically construed. The crux of my 
argument is that structure and agency theorists systematically fail to distinguish the 
metaphysical from the empirical modality of the relation between social structure and 
individual agency. Once this is recognised it can be seen that the “problem” of 
structure and agency is not a metaphysical problem, but just an intrinsic aspect of 
the range of empirical and interpretive issues that it is the social sciences’ raison 
d’être to investigate. This contention will be illustrated via a case study of the 
competing explanations of perpetrator behaviour in historian Christopher Browning’s 
(2001), and political scientist Daniel Goldhagen’s (1997), celebrated studies of the 
German Order Police in the Holocaust. 
 
2. Free Will and Determinism / Structure and Agency 
 
The metaphysical problem of free will and determinism arises from the difficulty of 
reconciling two seemingly unavoidable, but mutually contradictory, core beliefs about 
ourselves as human beings and the wider world of which we are a part. The first is 
that it is free will that distinguishes human beings from all others; the second is that 
human beings are wholly natural creatures, embedded in the ongoing causal order of 
the universe. 
Free will, as conceived by the theorists cited in note 2, consists 
paradigmatically in the ability to choose an action from a range of possible 
alternatives, thence to enact the chosen alternative. This ability is 
phenomenologically familiar to everyone. As John Searle (2001, 15) reminds us, if 
one reflects on “any situation of rational decision making and acting” one will elicit 
the experience of facing “alternative possibilities” of action. From this first-person 
standpoint it certainly seems to be the case that, whatever action one did perform, 
one could have acted differently. However, from the third-person naturalistic 
standpoint it can be hard to see how this experience of freedom corresponds to 
something real. 
Naturalism is the metaphysical assumption that the universe contains no non-
natural or super-natural entities, substances, powers, forces or events. Thus human 
beings are creatures made up solely of physical, chemical, and biological materials 
and processes. Human actions are therefore natural events, occurring in space and 
time. Because human actions are natural events, and if every natural event has a 
cause, or a set of causal conditions, as most philosophers believe to be the case, 
then human actions must also be causally generated. Every human action is, then, 
preceded by a set of events and conditions (typically taken to consist in an admixture 
of beliefs and desires) that brought about its occurrence. 
Here we come up against the fundamental problem at the core of the debate 
over free will and determinism: How can an action that is caused be free? The very 
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idea can seem oxymoronic. If all human actions are caused, then it seems that the 
actor’s experience of facing genuine alternative possibilities is illusory. 
It is apparent that the problem of structure and agency closely resembles the 
metaphysical problem of free will and determinism. The former ponders: How can 
individuals be subject to social-structural causation and freely- choosing and acting 
agents? Its resemblance to the metaphysical problem is acknowledged by those 
structurationists that describe the problem of structure and agency (confusedly, and 
question-beggingly) as the need to overcome the “dualism between voluntarism and 
determinism” (Archer 1982, 456; Carlsnaes 1992, 245; Lewis 2000, 250; Bieler & 
Morton 2001, 9). 
It might be claimed that there is something specific to the problem of structure 
and agency in virtue of the peculiar ontology of social structure.3 It is widely 
acknowledged that human agency is a necessary condition for the existence and 
functioning of social structure. “Social structures”, Bhaskar (1989, 40) proclaims, 
“exist only in virtue of, and are exercised only in, human agency” (cf. Giddens 1976, 
121; Wendt 1987, 359), and are “concept dependent”, that is, operate only via 
people’s understandings of their activities and relations with one another. Because of 
these features of its ontology, structurationists maintain that social structure can only 
influence or condition action, not determine it (see sections 5.I and 5.II below for 
further discussion). 
I contend, though, that the ontology of social structure is irrelevant to the 
question of whether, and how, it impacts causally on individuals’ possibilities of 
action. In my view, social structure could just as well exercise causal effects on 
individuals if it consists solely in the actions, beliefs and understandings of the 
individuals that constitute it, as it could if it exists at a supra-individual level of reality. 
No-one would think that because a crowd or mob is made up solely of individuals 
and their understandings that it can only behave in the way that its constituent 
members are motivated to act qua individuals. 
There are, nevertheless, important questions to ask about the causal effects 
of social structure on people’s possibilities of acting. I will go on to argue that, for the 
purposes of social science, these are empirical (and of course, interpretive), not 
metaphysical, questions. Addressing the empirical questions needs no concern with 
whether people have free will or how it is possible in relation to the wider causal 
order. In my view, the real questions for the social sciences concern the conditions 
under which people are able to exercise their free will and in which ways they may 
be susceptible to various sources and modes of social-structural causation. This 
________ 
 
3 For example, Colin Hay (2009, 265) asserts: “the nature of the relationship between structure 
and agency is of a qualitatively different kind if the structures in question are natural/physical 
than if they are social/political”. 
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contention will be substantiated after setting out the available stances in the 
contemporary philosophical debate over free will and determinism. The aim of this 
exercise is partly to show which stances on free will and determinism are 
metaphysically plausible from the point of view of the social sciences, but ultimately 
to show that no particular stance is strictly needed. 
 
3. Is Free Will Compatible with Causal Determination? 
 
A natural reaction to the intuition that the causal determination of actions would 
exclude the possibility of the agent being able to have acted other than they did is to 
think that free actions are not determined by antecedent causes. But on further 
reflection the absence of causation looks no more hospitable to free action than its 
presence. The problem is that if actions are not caused (by the actor’s beliefs and 
desires), then they would appear to be random, capricious and irrational. 
We seem, then, to be left with the conundrum that free will is incompatible 
with choices, decisions and actions being causally determined, yet also incompatible 
with them not being causally determined. Attempted solutions to the conundrum 
divide between embracement and rejection of this incompatibility.  
Those philosophers that affirm the intuition that free actions cannot be 
causally determined are known as incompatibilists. Incompatibilism subdivides into 
hard determinists, who that assert that causal determination reigns universally and 
therefore there is no free will, and libertarians, who reason that because there are 
free human actions, causal determination does not reign universally. Both branches 
of incompatibilism have historically been, and still are, the minority views in 
philosophy, though there are more libertarians than hard determinists (Nichols 2007). 
The majority view, known as compatibilism, holds that there is no incompatibility 
between an action being free and it being causally determined. Robert Kane (1999, 
218), a leading libertarian, describes compatibilism as “the reigning view among 
contemporary philosophers”. 
Before proceeding, a note on the meaning and use of “determinism” is in 
order. “Determinism” is one of those words in the vocabulary of contemporary social 
science that is invariably deployed pejoratively against someone else’s theory or 
explanation. To say that a theory, explanation or interpretation is “deterministic” is 
typically presented as a fundamental objection to it, with no further elaboration 
required (Duus-Otterström 2009, 575). For example, Archer (1982, 458) presents the 
view of “institutions as causes of action” as having “deterministic overtones”. I will 
argue later that the proposition that institutions are causes of action is in itself neutral 
between a deterministic and indeterministic conception of causation. 
The reason that determinism is frequently seen to be so objectionable is 
probably due to the fatalistic connotations of the concept. Fatalism is the idea that 
what happens occurs regardless of the aims, desires, and intentions of the actors 
involved, and that what will happen in the future has already been fixed and we are 
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inexorably reeled in by it.4 It is encapsulated by the thought that the exact time and 
mode of one’s death has been fixed - predestined - even before one’s birth (not just 
that there will be some particular day in the future on which one will die, from some 
particular set of causes, which themselves are the consequence of some prior 
causes, etc.). But in itself the concept determinism does not entail fatalism (see 
Hoefer 2016).  
The word “determinism” can also evoke the superstition of a super-force over 
and above mere causation, whereby causes seem not just to yield effects, but to 
force them to occur with an iron will (see quotes from Ayer [1997] in section II 
below). But to say of an event Y that it was determined by X is just to say that it was 
caused by X, or that X featured prominently in its causation. 
I proceed now to examine the metaphysics of libertarianism and compatibilism 
in more detail, with the aim of identifying and crystallising the points of greatest 
salience to the social sciences. I will not consider hard determinism any further, 
partly because it has so little philosophical and commonsense credence, and partly 
because it has little attraction for contemporary social scientists or theorists anyway.5  
 
I. Libertarianism  
 
Libertarianism seems to chime with our intuitions on free will and the 
phenomenology of intentional action.6 Its basic principle is that at least some of our 
actions are not causally determined by antecedent states and events. This is a 
“categorical” claim about free actions, whereby the agent might have acted 
differently to how they did act, even with exactly “the same causal antecedents of the 
action” remaining in place (Searle 2001, 277). There are three main types of 
libertarianism: 
 
________ 
 
4 Ruth Groff’s (2014, 74) claim that determinism is the view that “the world [is] such that 
everything that can and will happen is, at all points in time, already fixed”, is actually a 
statement of fatalism. 
5 Marx and Durkheim are conventionally depicted as determinists of the “hard” variety, but 
this is a mistake in my view. I believe that their theories cohere perfectly well with both 
compatibilism and the “indeterministic” version of libertarianism that I exposit below. 
6 Kane (1999, 218) contends that “most ordinary persons start out as natural [libertarian] 
incompatibilists” and are only “talked out” of it “by the clever arguments of philosophers”. 
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i. Non-causal libertarianism holds that free actions are not caused at all; rather, the 
agent “makes it the case that [her action] occurs, not by causing it, but by simply 
performing it” (Ginet 1997, 88). 
ii. Agent-causal libertarianism also holds that free actions are not causally 
determined by antecedent states and events, but insists that they are caused, by the 
agent herself. Here, the agent is conceived as a unique “substance” that acts as an 
un-caused causer of her actions. Thus “when an agent acts freely, she is in a strict 
and literal sense an originator of her action” (Clarke 2008).  
 
iii. Indeterministic libertarianism7 is a causal theory, albeit one that postulates that 
at some point in the genesis of a free action some of its causes operate 
indeterministically (or non-deterministically). The core idea of indeterministic 
causation is that of causes which do not necessitate their effects. Thus an action 
would be indeterministically caused if the following counterfactual holds: were the 
circumstances leading up to that action to be repeated a number of times with every 
fact about the actor’s psychology and external environment remaining the same, 
sometimes the action would occur as it originally did and sometimes it would not. 
This is the “categorical” conception of “could have done otherwise”. As Ekstrom 
(2016, 4) alternatively puts it, “an indeterministic or nonnecessitating cause is one 
that can fail to produce its effect, even without the intervention of anything to 
frustrate it”. 
According to Alfred Mele’s (1995) version of libertarianism, indeterministic 
causation affects which beliefs comes into the agent’s consideration when they 
deliberate on how to act. The decision and ensuant action are then causally 
determined by the beliefs and desires that came to the agent’s mind.  
In Robert Kane’s much-discussed libertarian theory, on the other hand, 
indeterministic causation enters deliberation immediately prior to action, when the 
agent is considering what to do on the basis of (deterministically given) reasons that 
support competing possibilities of action. But this only occurs in situations wherein 
the agent’s flow of action is interrupted by the need to decide between competing 
alternatives of what to “do or become” (Kane 1999, 224). Examples include 
dilemmas over whether to act self-interestedly or morally, for instant or deferred 
gratification, or any occasion on which one finds oneself deliberating over alternative 
possibilities of what to do. Kane calls actions that are generated in this way “self-
forming actions”. It is with regard only to these actions that agents could have 
chosen to act otherwise (in the “categorical” sense). In such cases, up to the 
________ 
 
7 This is more commonly known as “event-causal” libertarianism, but since it shares its event-
causal ontology with compatibilism and hard determinism I use “indeterministic” for its prefix, 
because it is this feature that decisively distinguishes it.  
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moment of choice it is objectively open, that is, undetermined, which option the agent 
will choose to enact.  
 
II. Compatibilism 
 
The essence of the compatibilist position is simply that there is no incompatibility 
between an agent’s action being freely performed and it being causally determined. 
Free actions, according to this view, are caused by the decisions and intentions of 
the agent; their decisions and intentions are the causal outcome of deliberation on 
alternatives in light of their beliefs, desires and values, the latter themselves being 
causally acquired through interaction with the world. In contrast to libertarians’ 
commitment to a categorical reading of the “could have acted otherwise” principle, 
compatibilists commit only to a “counterfactual” rendition, such that the agent would 
have acted differently had his beliefs or desires been different in some respect to 
what they were. A counterfactual (compatibilist) rendition of the “could have acted 
otherwise” principle is consistent with its avowals cited in note 2, though I am sure 
that it is the categorical (libertarian) rendition that those authors had in mind. 
Compatibilists maintain that incompatibilist intuitions are naively rooted in a 
beguiling animistic picture of causation in which all modes of causation operate in the 
manner of force, compulsion or constraint. Ayer (1997 118) suggests that this picture 
derives from “primitive experiences of pushing and striking”, and fixation on “the 
example of one person’s exercising authority over another”, which conjure images of 
“an unhappy effect trying vainly to escape from the clutches of an overmastering 
cause”. But if one reflects on what occurs when one acts freely, one should see that 
there is no untoward sense of coercion or compulsion exercised on one’s actions by 
one’s beliefs and desires (contrast this with obsessive beliefs and addictive desires). 
This sense of benign force is nicely captured in Jürgen Habermas’s (2007, 87) 
resonant motto on “the ‘non-coercive force’ of the better argument”.  
 
4. A Theory of Free Will for the Social Sciences: Compatibilism or 
Libertarianism? 
 
Having already excluded hard determinism, I now probe the strengths and 
weaknesses of the libertarian and compatibilist theories of free will outlined above, 
with a view to arriving at recommendations for social scientists and theorists 
concerned with the “metaphysical foundations” of their subject domain.  
The principal problem faced by libertarian theories is that if a supposedly free 
action is subject to indeterministic causation, or no antecedent causation at all, then 
some degree of caprice, randomness and luck is involved in its performance. The 
problem can be illustrated by thinking about a commonplace event in social 
interaction. Suppose Jones sees Singh approach with hand extended in anticipation 
of exchanging greetings. What will Jones do? If her action is not caused by anything 
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antecedent to it, or if indeterminism enters into the process, is it not as likely that 
Jones will present her hand and then withdraw it at the last moment, or display a 
clenched fist, or turn around and walk away, or kiss Singh on the lips, as it is that she 
will shake Singh’s hand in the conventional way? Moreover, how would Jones 
herself know what she will do prior to acting?  
Non-causal and agent-causal libertarian theories fare particularly badly in the 
face of the “luck problem” because they depict agents as causally disconnected from 
the antecedent circumstances out of which they act. It is clear why this is so with 
non-causal libertarianism. It is also clearly so for most agent-causal theories since 
these regard the agent as a unique “substance” with causal powers unlike anything 
else in the natural world. This is a view of the agent as a noumenal or immaterial self 
with powers of ex nihilo origination. As Randolph Clarke notes, such a conception of 
the agent and their powers is regarded “(even by proponents) as strange or even 
mysterious” (1996, 20).8 But Ruth Groff (2014; 2016) has recently advanced a critical 
realist inspired, naturalistic agent-causal theory that endeavours to eschew this 
mysteriousness.9 
Groff (2016, 7-8) argues that both indeterministic libertarianism and 
compatibilism are susceptible to what Pereboom (2004, 276) calls the “disappearing 
agent objection”. This objection targets the ontology shared by indeterministic 
libertarian and compatibilist theories, namely, the idea that free actions are, and are 
caused (either indeterministically or deterministically) by, events. For both kinds of 
theory, the latter events are reasons, that is, beliefs and desires that come to the 
agent’s mind and upon which they deliberate when deciding how to act. But from the 
agent-causalist’s perspective, under event-causal theories it is not the agent as such 
that chooses her action; rather, her “choice” is but the outcome of a causal process 
(the occurrence and effects of beliefs and desires) that just happens. The agent-
causalist counters that a free action is one that the agent herself causes “on the 
basis of”, “for”, or “in response to”, her reasons for acting one way or another (Groff 
________ 
 
8 Some of those that have held agent-causal theories have gone on to retract them. See Goetz 
(1988, 303,n1) on Taylor’s and Chisholm’s, and Clarke (2007, 56, n6) on his own, 
renunciation. 
9 Giddens (1976, 85) also subscribes to agent-causal libertarianism but offers no exposition or 
defence of it. Bhaskar’s (1989, 98) speculation that the powers of agency may be borne by a 
“substance that is of an immaterial kind” suggests that he was open to a traditional version of 
agent-causation (which would not sit well with his naturalism). The critical realist economist 
Tony Lawson (1997, 176), likewise, claims that “human agents” possess “specific powers and 
dispositions which serve to differentiate them from the rest of reality”. On the other hand, 
Bhaskar also maintains that “human action” is (non-deterministically [1989, 90]) “caused by 
states of mind” (1989, 96), which suggests indeterministic libertarianism. 
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2014, 86; 2016, 15). But neither the reasons, nor anything else prior to her choice, 
causes (indeterministically or deterministically) her causing of that choice.  
Groff holds that, as an irreducible “substance”, the agent is metaphysically in 
the same boat as everything else in the world that bears a causal power, and that 
therefore there is no difficulty in conceiving how the agent relates to the rest of the 
causal order. The exercise of a causal power by anything, according to critical 
realists, is always undetermined, that is, prior to its occurrence the power might, or 
might not, be exercised. As Groff (2016, 4) puts it, that which has causal power 
thereby has the capacity to generate “activity that may or may not occur, and which, 
if it does, may or may not issue in any given outcome”. This is a much more 
thoroughgoing indeterminism (or “non-determinism”, as Groff prefers) than that to 
which indeterministic libertarians typically subscribe, wherein indeterminism is held 
to exist only in certain domains. The latter is why, I think, indeterministic 
libertarianism is not as vulnerable to the “luck problem” as some of its critics, 
including Groff, charge.  
Theories such as Mele’s and Kane’s are careful to limit the scope and role of 
indeterministic causation in the generation of free actions. Consider again the hand-
shaking case. According to Mele’s account, indeterminism might affect which of 
Jones’s beliefs come to her in deliberation. For example, the belief formed a month 
previously that she was belittled by Singh may or may not come to the fore. But most 
of Jones’s relevant beliefs will be causally determined by the nature of the situation, 
such that she will perceive the prima facie expectation to shake the other’s hand. 
Likewise, on Kane’s account, if Jones’s action is not straightforwardly determined by 
her “will already formed” it is because she is conflicted over which action to perform. 
Her beliefs, desires and values are such that she contemplates reasons to perform 
two or more different possible actions, and which one she chooses is undetermined 
by those reasons until she makes her choice. But the indeterministically caused 
decision that Jones eventually makes arises out of conflicting reasons for action that 
are themselves causally determined for her (in the current example, there is the 
desire to express disdain for Singh and the desire to maintain public decorum). 
I have been considering the metaphysical freedom of paradigmatically free 
actions, namely, those that issue from the agent’s reflection on, and deliberation 
over, alternative possibilities of acting. But the large majority of our actions do not 
issue from reflection or deliberation (as is acknowledged by structurationists such as 
Giddens [1982, 9], Bhaskar [1986, 163] and Hay [2002, 266-7 n5]). Routine, non-
reflective actions are actions of the agent, but are we to say of these too that “the 
agent could have acted otherwise”? There is of course no difficulty in saying this in 
the counterfactual sense, that is, that the agent would have done something different 
had their beliefs or desires been different in some respect to what they were. This is 
what compatibilists would say, and indeterministic libertarians such as Kane can 
answer similarly, that such actions are causally determined by “a will already 
formed”, to which the counterfactual sense of “could have acted otherwise” 
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straightforwardly applies. Indeterministic libertarians could also say that 
indeterministic causation may pertain to many, most, or all routine actions too, in that 
they are not causally necessitated by the agent’s antecedent beliefs and desires. 
Under this scenario the agent might have acted differently in the “categorical” sense, 
in virtue of the same set of beliefs and desires issuing in a different action. 
Nevertheless, the degree of indeterminism involved in the generation of routine 
actions must be quite small (i.e. the probabilities close to 1) or they simply would not 
be routine actions, and personal and social life would not be as ordered and regular 
as it evidently is.  
I am not sure what agent-causalism of the kind propounded by Groff would 
say about routine actions. Groff (2014, 76) seems to say that they too are caused by 
the agent: “agents, rather than antecedent events plus the laws of nature, are the 
causes of what agents do”. But they are not caused via the agent’s deployment of 
their “second-order” “agential powers” of reflection, deliberation and choice, or they 
would not be routine actions. So how does the agent self-cause routine actions? One 
possibility would be that they issue from environmental cues that trigger first-order 
agential powers (i.e. essentially the same account as that of indeterministic 
libertarianism and compatibilism). But then it would not be the agent, exclusively, 
that causes these actions; antecedent events would play a causally initiating role, 
and it would not be the case that “the agent is not a link in a chain of events” (2016, 
8). 
As we have seen, all the main protagonists agree that the agent’s beliefs and 
desires (which constitute their reasons for acting) are centrally involved in the 
production of their actions, whether as deterministic or indeterministic causal events, 
or as “the basis” upon which the agent self-causes their decisions and intentions. 
The means by which beliefs and desires are acquired and held is therefore of central 
significance to thinking about free will, and to the explanation of social action. 
Despite its evident significance, there is very little discussion of “doxastic 
voluntarism” in the free will literature. I focus on belief, but the same considerations 
apply to desire (see Clarke 2007, 52). 
Following Bernard Williams’ (1973) seminal paper on the topic, 
epistemologists widely agree that we cannot simply choose or decide what to 
believe, and that the possibility of believing otherwise is not (directly) under our 
control. The givenness of belief can be demonstrated by adverting to the modal 
contrast between action and belief: Whereas actions can be reflectively chosen and 
enacted, beliefs cannot (Steup 2008, 375). With regard to action, everyone (including 
hard determinists) will presumably agree that we often have the experience of at 
least seeming to choose our actions. But there is no experience of even seeming to 
choose our beliefs. Consider these propositions:  
 
i. “Cats are mammals”.  
ii. “Cats are insects”.  
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iii. “The number of cats is even”. 
(Steup 2008, 389)  
 
It is apparent that one cannot choose to believe that cats are not mammals, or that 
they are insects; and one can believe neither that the total number of cats in the 
world is even nor that it is odd (because one knows that one does not and cannot 
know which is the case) (ibid.). 
We surely want our beliefs to be, and believe that most of them are, causally 
determined by their object, by what actually is the case. Ideally our beliefs would be 
causally determined by their putative objects in the way that our perceptual beliefs 
(usually) are: If one looks at an apple, an apple is what one sees; one cannot just 
choose to see an orange instead (see Searle 2001, 68-9).  
 I am not sure what Groff and other critical realists would say about the 
causation of belief, but they are opposed to the idea of determinism across the 
board, both in the “natural” and the “social” domain (Porpora 2015, 117). They might 
well hold, then, that beliefs are only ever (like everything else) indeterministically 
caused. Still, the agent is no more able to choose what to believe if her beliefs are 
indeterministically caused than if they are deterministically caused. Suppose there is 
a .99 probability that a normally socialised, cognitively competent, person will believe 
that they should shake hands when they perceive themselves to be in a situation that 
calls for hand-shaking. 1 person in 100 in such a situation will, therefore, form the 
deviant belief that there is no requirement to shake hands. But this person has no 
more chosen what to believe than the other 99 has. The modal contrast with action 
shows that actions are things we do, whereas beliefs are things that happen to us. In 
sum, belief in universal indeterminism does not commit one to doxastic voluntarism.  
It seems to me that the “luck problem” that libertarianism faces is 
circumvented if doxastic involuntarism is accepted. Because our beliefs and desires 
are (deterministically or indeterministically) given to us, when we enter into 
deliberation on how to act, the alternative possibilities that we contemplate are 
limited by what to come to mind. Only a relatively small number of the practically 
feasible and desirable alternatives will do so. For example, returning again to the 
hand-shaking scenario, the action-situation causes Jones’s belief that normally one 
is expected to reciprocate the gesture. Given this belief, and given her (conflicting) 
desires on what to do, the range of alternatives she will consider is limited 
accordingly. Entering into reflection and deliberation over alternative possibilities of 
action is itself a caused (again, deterministically or indeterministically) response to 
an interruption in, or disturbance to, the ongoing stream of routine actions in which 
the agent is immersed. In essence, then, libertarians can acknowledge that there is a 
pervasive causal background that conditions the range of alternative possibilities of 
acting, upon which agents reflect and deliberate in the production of their free 
actions. This is why people do not usually behave randomly, capriciously or bizarrely 
in relation to their situational context. 
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I. Adjudication  
 
I am now in a position to adjudicate the plausibility and suitability, for the social 
sciences, of libertarian and compatibilist theories of free will. 
I do not think that there is much practical difference between indeterminism 
and determinism per se, especially if indeterminism is confined to specific domains 
(e.g. the subatomic; human decision-making [see Kane 1999]). Universal 
indeterminism, on the other hand, appears to be the polar-opposite of determinism. 
But there is a big difference between a universally indeterministic world in which no 
causal power has a high probability of occurring or producing its effect and one in 
which different types of phenomena have varying degrees of causal efficacy, with 
many behaving in regular and orderly ways. In short, it is amounts or degrees of 
indeterminism that matter, not whether or not it is universal.  
Consequently, although there is endless disputation between compatibilists 
and indeterministic libertarians in the philosophical literature, I contend that for the 
purposes of the social sciences (at least) there is little to choose between them.10 I 
have already given the principal reasons for this judgment, namely, that in virtue of 
sharing an event-causal ontology compatibilists and indeterministic libertarians 
accept that the reasons upon which agents reflect and deliberate when deciding how 
to act are causally given to them. Further, they agree that the agent’s powers of 
reflection and deliberation are embedded in the stream of routine actions that 
constitute the agent’s lifeworld. For both compatibilists and indeterministic 
libertarians, when an agent performs a free action at the culmination of deliberation, 
the action they choose is supported by some subset of the reasons upon which they 
have been deliberating, and thus it is not random or capricious in relation to their 
action-situation. As Ekstrom (2016, 13) puts it, such an act “is not an event that 
appears out of nowhere”. In terms of the agent’s capacity to act freely, I aver that it 
makes no substantial difference whether the reasons upon which they deliberate 
come to them deterministically or indeterministically, or cause their actions 
deterministically or indeterministically.  
It is of central significance to the social sciences that indeterministic 
libertarianism, no less than compatibilism, is consistent with some, indeed many, 
actions being causally affected (deterministically or indeterministically) by social-
structural sources of causation. Indeterministic libertarianism is, after all, a causal 
theory of action, making it eminently harmonious with social scientific explanation. 
Put another way, my contention is that it would make no appreciable difference to 
________ 
 
10 Groff (2016, 9) is of a similar view, though she takes their similarity to incur a shared 
deficiency, whereas I see it much more positively. 
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the task of social scientific explanation were either compatibilism or indeterministic 
libertarianism to be true. This point will be illustrated in the case study to follow. 
Groff’s critical realist agent-causal libertarianism, does, however, stand out 
from compatibilism and indeterministic libertarianism. The sticky issue is not 
indeterminism as such, since Groff acknowledges the above point about varying 
degrees of causal efficacy for different types of phenomena: “powerful things vary in 
the regularity of their behavior” she says (2016, 4). The stand-out issue is the 
insistence that free (and routine) actions are caused by nothing other (that is, no 
preceding events or occurrences) than the agent’s decision and intention, which are 
originating causes, not stages of a prior causal process. The challenge, as 
acknowledged by Groff (2016, 9), is to address the objection: But what was it that 
“caused the agent to cause” the particular action that they performed?  
Groff says that the agent makes their decision and forms their intention to act 
“on the basis of”, “for”, or “in response to”, their reasons for acting one way or 
another. What, then, is the relation between their reasons and their first-causing of 
their action? One possible answer would be that the agent’s reasons 
indeterministically cause them to cause their action, but this would then collapse into 
indeterministic libertarianism. Groff herself insists that the relation between the 
agent’s reasons and their causing of their action is not itself causal. This then invites 
a continuation of the objection, namely: Granted that the agent self-causes her 
action “on the basis of” her reasons, in virtue of what is it that she elects to self-
cause one action rather than another? The answer cannot invoke any further 
reasons (beliefs and desires) of the agent in virtue of which they come to favour one 
particular subset of reasons from their deliberative set because these extra reasons 
would simply join those upon which they were deliberating in the first place. If the 
agent really is strictly the originating cause of their free actions there seems to be 
nothing in virtue of which they elect to act on one subset of reasons rather than 
another. The answer that Groff (2016, 9) gives to the objection is that it is “persisting 
powerful particulars [i.e. agents – Author] that do make things [i.e. agents’ free 
actions – Author] happen”. But this is not a satisfactory answer to the objection, 
because the objection will continue to press the question in revised formulation: In 
virtue of what is it that a “powerful particular” (agent) makes those things (their 
actions), rather than some other, happen? 
It is the conception of what happens in the circumstances leading up to the 
point at which the agent is said to self-cause their action that makes agent-causalism 
an uncongenial theory of free will for the social sciences. At issue is not just how (on 
what grounds) the agent makes the particular action choices that they do, but how 
they acquire the sets of reasons that delimit the range of possible actions that they 
consider to be open to themselves. In short, does agent-causalism recognise that 
the acquisition of beliefs and desires is a causal (albeit perhaps indeterministic) 
process embedded in the agent’s lifeworld, that reflection and deliberation are tied to 
the ongoing causal generation of routine action, and that the set of alternative 
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possibilities upon which agents deliberate are causally given to them, and may be 
constrained by, their social and institutional structure? These are causal processes 
that the social sciences are tasked with investigating, explaining and understanding. 
As Habermas (2007 86) nicely puts it, reasons “are not just ‘something in the head’ ”; 
they are “embodied in cultural traditions, anchored in institutions”.  
Groff (2016, 6) does countenance that agents’ engagement of their second-
order agential powers (of reflection, deliberation and choice) can be “triggered” by 
causal powers outside the agent,11 but even so, she says, “the triggered power is 
precisely a second-order power of choosing. It is the agent who…decides what, if 
anything, she will do, not the powerful thing that …had the power to spark the display 
of her agential powers.” The problem of on what basis the choosing agent makes her 
choice of action reappears here. In response to the “disappearing agent objection”, 
Groff’s agent-causal libertarianism purports to present a more “substantial” vision of 
the agent than compatibilism and indeterministic libertarianism are able to do. But by 
insisting that the agent herself causes her choice of action, with nothing 
(deterministically or indeterministically) causing that choice, the agent now looks very 
insubstantial and cut adrift from the sources of reasons that could enter into the 
causation of her choice. Thus it remains unclear to me how (in what modality) 
agents’ powers of self-causing their actions relate to and mesh with their social-
structural contexts which furnish them with many of their reasons for acting. The 
problem with agent-causal libertarianism is that to be a plausible theory of free will 
for the social sciences it needs to embrace the background causal ontology of 
compatibilism or indeterministic libertarianism.12 But if it did that it would forfeit its 
distinctiveness.  
My recommendation for social scientists and theorists concerned with the 
metaphysics of free will echoes Durkheim’s aphorism (above): there is no need to 
decide between determinism and indeterminism. They can proceed on the 
assumption that one or the other is the case, and then accept either a compatibilist 
or an indeterministic libertarian theory of free will, or be equanimously agnostic 
________ 
 
11 One might think that these agential powers have to be triggered by causal powers external 
to the agent, because the initial engagement of these powers cannot itself be the outcome of 
reflective choice. As Schroeder (2007, 82) nicely puts it, “every act of reflection starts 
somewhere, and the first thought that begins reflection is not chosen on the basis of 
reflection”. So with regard to reflectively chosen actions too (not just routine actions), it is 
hard to see how it can be, as Groff (2016, 8) maintains, that the agent is not “a link in a chain 
of events”. 
12 I thus concur with Clarke’s contention, as noted by Groff (2016, 15), that “a viable agent-
causal theory would have to be augmented by an event-causal account of acting for reasons”. 
Groff rejects the proposal. 
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between them (as I myself am). This contention will be illustrated and justified via the 
following case study. 
 
5. Structure and Agency in the Holocaust 
Questions of moral responsibility are frequently raised under the structure and agency 
debate, but I think this is a distracting conflation, so in this paper focus purely on the 
explanatory and interpretive issues. 
 
The case that I examine here is brutal and stark, but selected for the clarity with 
which it poses questions on individual choice, agency, and social-structural 
causation. It features opposed explanations of central events of the Holocaust 
proffered by Browning (2001) and Goldhagen (1997). The events in question 
consisted of massacres and deportations perpetrated by the 500-strong Reserve 
Police Battalion 101, the members of which directly killed 38000 Jews (by small arms 
gunfire) and sent a further 45000 to the Treblinka death camp during its sixteen-
month posting to Poland in 1942-3. Browning and Goldhagen draw on the same 
body of evidence and largely agree on the basic facts of what took place. They agree 
that the policemen of Battalion 101 were ordinary German citizens who were not 
specially selected for genocide and had no advance preparation for their genocidal 
tasks. Most pertinently, they agree that the policemen were not coerced by threats of 
dire consequence for non-participation in killing operations and knew that they could 
decline with official impunity (Browning estimates that 10-20% did), because they 
were told so by their commanding officer. 
Notwithstanding these central points of agreement, Browning and Goldhagen 
disagree over whether the policemen’s actions were the product of social-structural 
causes or “voluntarisitically” (Goldhagen 1997, 252) performed, and their 
explanations are commonly seen to provide “divergent answers to the question of 
the relationship between structure and agency…in the causation of the Holocaust” 
(Moses 1998, 199; Cf. Roth 2002, 319; Hay 2002, 96-101). 
Browning’s explanation centres on the claim that social-structural, situational, 
and group-dynamic forces, pressures and constraints exercised powerful effects on 
the policemen’s behaviour. He argues that the majority did what they did not 
because they were infused with genocidal beliefs and desires, but because they 
found themselves in stressful circumstances that confronted them with normative 
pressures to obey, comply and conform which were hard to resist. The policemen 
were, he claims, in a situation analogous to that of the subjects in Milgram’s (1974) 
infamous “obedience experiment” (Browning 2001, 173-4).  
For some of Milgram’s reluctantly obedient subjects the speed and 
transformation of events had the effect of disabling or distracting them from engaging 
in deliberation on how they should act. Other reluctantly obedient subjects did 
engage in deliberation, but experienced acute conflict between wanting to follow their 
conscience (by refusing to deliver the “electric shocks”) and wanting to discharge 
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their duty to the experiment. Likewise, some of the policemen were so caught up in 
the radical turn of events (having been deployed on policing operations, they are 
suddenly one day assigned to killing operations) that they just “got on with it”, without 
reflecting on what they ought to do. Others were torn in deliberation between “the 
demands of conscience” and “the norms of the battalion” (ibid. 185).  
Goldhagen takes the opposite stance. He (1997, 477) argues that the 
“impersonal institutions and abstract structures” invoked by Browning (and many 
other Holocaust scholars in the explanation of kindred events) cannot explain the 
events. The policemen must be recognised, he maintains, as “responsible actors” 
who “were ultimately the authors of their own actions” (ibid., 482). As such, “they 
were people who had beliefs and values about the wisdom of the regime’s policies 
which informed the choices that they made” (ibid., 477), including the choice of 
whether or not to participate in mass-killing operations. Goldhagen marshals 
evidence purporting to show that the vast majority of policemen believed, in 
concordance with most of the German population, that Jews constituted an evil, 
corrosive, subversive “race” that posed a mortal threat to their own conditions of 
existence. These “eliminationist” beliefs, which were the commonsense “cultural 
cognitive” currency of the society in which the policemen lived, motivated the 
policemen to participate willingly and enthusiastically in genocidal killing “in good 
conscience”, believing it to be a “just and necessary” cause (ibid., 15, 394).  
Browning’s and Goldhagen’s explanations clearly sit on opposite sides of the 
structure and agency dichotomy. Browning argues that the events of the genocidal 
killing issued from social-structural causes. Thus, counterfactually: absent these 
external forces, pressures and constraints, the (majority of) men would not have 
participated in the massacres. Goldhagen, though, argues that the policemen’s 
actions issued freely from their own autonomous wills, given what they believed. 
Thus, counterfactually: absent the men’s eliminationist beliefs, the social causes that 
Browning invokes would not be sufficient to make the men do what they would then 
have believed to be seriously morally wrong. Nevertheless, according to the 
argument of this paper, the disagreement between Browning and Goldhagen is over 
structure and agency in the empirical sense; the question of free will and 
determinism (structure and agency in the metaphysical sense) is irrelevant to it.  
 
 I. Structure and agency in the empirical sense  
 
With regard to Browning’s explanation, one might think that its emphasis on social-
structural causation makes it “deterministic” and agency-denying. In the “ordinary 
language” sense of “determined”, it is deterministic in that it attributes an overriding 
causal role to the social-structural conditions of the men’s choices and actions. But 
the explanation does not entail that the policemen lacked agency or free will. The 
explanation claims that social-structural causes obstructed or distracted some 
policemen from engaging in deliberation, and made it hard for those who did 
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deliberate to choose the option that they preferred. So the explanation in fact 
assumes that the men had a free will, upon which social causes impinged.13 But it 
presupposes no particular metaphysical theory of free will, and is indifferent to 
whether the world is universally deterministic or indeterministic to some degree.  
Whether or not determinism is true is irrelevant to Browning’s explanation of 
the policemen’s actions. There being a large majority of policemen that, ex 
hypothesi, succumbed to social causes impacting on their decision-making 
capacities is no evidence for determinism (though obviously is consistent with it). 
After all, a small minority of policemen resisted the pressures of those social causes 
by declining or desisting participation in killing operations. Thus the social causes 
could be conceived as operating either indeterministically or deterministically (the 
latter by invoking other countervailing causally determining factors, such as features 
of the character or personal experience of these particular individuals). In short, 
Browning’s explanation is an empirical claim about the effects of certain social 
causes, and is consistent with both determinism and indeterminism.  
 Goldhagen’s explanation, with its emphasis on the policemen willingly acting 
in the way that they believed right and just, and its rejection of the idea that they 
were induced to commit genocide by external social causes of the kind that 
Browning invokes, clearly prioritises individual agency. Goldhagen continually tells 
the reader that the policemen acted “voluntarisitically” and autonomously. Indeed, 
Goldhagen takes a universalist stance on the structure–agency dichotomy, asserting 
that it is “erroneous” to think “that ‘structures’ cause action”. For “the structures”, he 
says, “are always interpreted by the actors” (1997, 20) [Goldhagen (1997, p. 493, n47) 
refers the reader to Giddens’s structuration theory, where Giddens (1984, p. 181) denounces the 
“implacable causal forms’ given to the idea of “structural constraint” by “structural sociologists’.]. 
That is, whilst structures can “provide inducements to act”, such inducements are 
only ever considered by the agent in deciding what to do.14 
________ 
 
13 Browning (2001, 221) makes the assumption explicit, asserting that the policemen “not 
only had the capacity to choose but exercised that choice in various ways”. 
14 This is similar to the critical realist conception of the relation between social structure and 
individual agency. Porpora (2015, 117), for example, contends that “whatever causal effects 
material phenomena [social structure – Author] may exert, no laws govern the human, agential 
response, which will always exhibit degrees of creativity”. Goldhagen though does not go so 
far as to contend that the agential response to social causes is inevitably lawless and creative, 
just that the response is necessarily mediated by agents’ interpretations. As we have seen, he 
does not think that such responses are inevitably idiosyncratic; on the contrary, his explanation 
of the policemen’s behaviour is that most of them automatically applied the same interpretation 
to the social cues. 
19 
 
 
 Despite taking a strong stance on the explanatory priority of individual agency 
over social structure, and despite being diametrically opposed to Browning’s 
explanation, Goldhagen’s explanation of the policemen’s actions is nonetheless a 
causal explanation. It claims that the policemen’s beliefs, desires and values were 
the “motivational cause” of their (free) actions (1997, 416). Moreover, the acquisition 
and holding of these beliefs is explained as the social-structurally caused effects of 
the policemen’s societal location. Whilst the latter explanation does not contradict his 
claim that social structure cannot directly cause agents’ actions, it does accord a 
primary causal role to the acquisition and holding of those mental states upon which 
agents’ interpretations, choices and decisions are based when deciding how to act.  
 It is because Goldhagen’s explanation is causal that it, like Browning’s, 
coheres equally well with compatibilism and indeterministic libertarianism. So, whilst 
Goldhagen’s explanation falls on the “agency” side of the structure-agency 
dichotomy, it takes no stance on whether compatibilism or indeterministic 
libertarianism makes best metaphysical sense of personal agency. Goldhagen 
evidently thinks that all social explanations must likewise fall on the “agency” side of 
the structure-agency dichotomy. If that is so then of course an adequate explanation 
of the policemen’s actions would have to be grounded in their personal agency. But 
Goldhagen’s reason for according universal priority to individual agency, namely, 
that social-structural causes “are always interpreted by the actors” seems 
demonstrably false. To take a simple counterexample, when a driver stops at a red 
traffic light they have (usually) acted purely responsively, without reflection or 
interpretation.  
Goldhagen’s claim that the policemen’s actions were the product of their 
reflective, interpretive agency must therefore also be taken as an empirical claim. His 
explanation then has the same epistemic status as Browning’s, and either 
explanation could be true. Which one, if either, is true is, I contend, an empirical 
matter. The opposition between Browning’s and Goldhagen’s explanations exhibits 
as clear a bifurcation over structure and agency as there could be, and yet the truth 
of either determinism or indeterminism, and compatibilism or indeterministic 
libertarianism, is irrelevant to the adjudication of their explanations.  
 
II. Adjudicating the dispute over structure and agency empirically  
 
In order to adjudicate Browning’s and Goldhagen’s contrasting explanations we need 
answers to the following empirical questions: 
 
i. What alternative possibilities of acting did the policemen believe were available 
to them, and what degree of desirability, difficulty, costliness or repugnance did 
they attach to these options? 
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ii. What were the contents of the policemen’s beliefs, desires and values in 
relation to their victims? In particular, what did they believe about the existential 
and moral status of their victims? Did they believe that Jews presented a mortal 
threat to their way of life? Did they have an intense fear, hatred and loathing of 
Jews (Goldhagen 1997, passim), or was their attitude one of indifference and 
apathy (Browning 2001, 200)? 
 
iii. Can social structures, of the kind in which the policemen were embedded, 
exercise causal effects that impede the engagement of agents’ reflective 
capacities or make agents’ preferred choices hard to select and act upon? 
 
Whatever the difficulty attached to these questions, they are, I maintain, empirical 
questions, the answers to which are not derivable from metaphysical theories of free 
will and determinism. 
With regard to the first question, there is uncontested empirical evidence that 
the policemen knew they could decline participation, or discontinue, with impunity. 
How difficult these options were experienced as being depends on answers to the 
questions posed in (ii) and (iii). 
For the second question, I acknowledge that it can be very hard to establish 
definitively the contents of historical actors’ intentional states. But this difficulty does 
not ipso facto make it a metaphysical question. For example, it may be impossible 
now to find out what I ate for dinner on April 1st 1981. Nevertheless, there is a fact of 
the matter as to what I ate then, making it an empirical, not a metaphysical, question. 
There are interesting metaphysical questions to ask about intentional states per se, 
such as whether representationalist, dispositionalist, functionalist, internalist, 
externalist, etc. theories best capture their nature. But however interesting these 
questions are qua metaphysical inquiry, they are irrelevant to what it was that the 
policemen (or anyone else) actually believed, desired, intended, etc.  
 The third question, on the possible effects of social structure on the 
policemen’s actions, requires some reflection on how social-structural causation 
operates. Structurationists (and Goldhagen) maintain that social-structural causation 
is necessarily mediated by agents’ interpretations. Giddens (1984, 181) draws a 
distinction between the causal effects of the “forces of nature” (“an earthquake”, for 
example), and the effects of social structure which, he says, “do not operate 
independently of the motives and reasons the agents have for what they do” (cf. 
Carlsnaes 1992, 255). I reject the categoricalness of this distinction. Some types of 
social-structural causation do, I counter, exercise coercive or constraining effects in 
a manner directly analogous to the “forces of nature”.  
For example, a system of penal rules exercises effects that are “brute” 
constraints on the wills of the individuals subjected to it, regardless of what they think 
about it and whatever their motives and reasons are. The same holds for the network 
of institutional structures (through which Reich policy was generated and 
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implemented) that brought the policemen of Battalion 101 to Polish towns and 
villages and confronted them with a choice to make on participation in genocidal 
killing. This source of social-structural causation, which is presupposed by 
Goldhagen’s as well as Browning’s explanation, exercises causal effects on 
individuals independently of their interpretations, motives and reasons for action. By 
setting limits and impediments to, and constraints on, agents’ alternative possibilities 
of action, this mode of social-structural causation constitutes the conditions in which 
individuals are situated, thereby impacting on them in a way that is closely 
analogous to the effects of the “forces of nature”.  
Other modes of social-structural causation do exercise their effects via the 
beliefs and desires (and sometimes interpretations) of the individuals subject to 
them, principally by causing the acquisition and sustenance of those beliefs and 
desires. Because agents’ actions are caused (deterministically or indeterministically) 
by their beliefs and desires, social-structural causation here plays a strongly 
conditioning, constraining and impelling role. For example, coming under the sway of 
bureaucratic organisation, formal role occupancy, authority relations, or group 
conformity pressure, may cause the formation of action-causing beliefs, desires and 
attitudes, such as: One should concentrate on doing one’s job to the best of one’s 
ability; one should respond dutifully to a legitimate order; it is best to do what 
everyone else similarly situated is doing. If such beliefs, desires and attitudes are 
induced they will shape the scope and contents of the alternative possibilities of 
action upon which agents deliberate, and will make some options seem more or less 
desirable or costly than others. This type of social-structural causation does not 
cause people’s actions immediately, without resort to their motives and reasons. 
Rather, it causes, or contributes to the causation of, what those motives and reasons 
are, by causing (some of) the agent’s beliefs and desires. 
The extent to which forms of social organisation such as bureaucracy, 
authority relations, formal role occupancy, peer pressure, and group dynamics are 
capable of exercising coercive or impellent effects on individuals under their 
dominion is amenable to empirical investigation and observation. Finding out how 
people respond to, and behave in the face of, these forms of social and institutional 
organisation is in principle no different to investigating the effects on people of 
“forces of nature” such as radiation (the force of which is not diminished if it 
exercises its effects indeterministically). Social scientific experimentation and 
observation has shown that social structure does indeed induce such beliefs and 
desires, and that many people do decide to act, or just act, in a largely uniform and 
22 
 
 
compliant way, as the policemen of Battalion 101 did according to Browning’s 
account.15  
If the policemen did not have the eliminationist beliefs and desires that 
Goldhagen attributes to them it can reasonably be concluded that the prime mover of 
their actions was external social causes. Conversely, if the policemen did hold such 
eliminationist beliefs and desires then he is justified in concluding that the prime 
mover of their actions was their own autonomous agency. 
 I have argued that both Browning’s and Goldhagen’s explanations of the 
events are consistent with the most plausible metaphysical theories of free will and 
causation (as surveyed in section 4). Thus both of their opposed (in terms of 
“structure” and “agency”) explanations are empirically possible, and also, I believe 
(though I have not been able to provide adequate justification here), empirically 
plausible. It has not been my aim to adjudicate which is in fact the best explanation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The so-called problem of structure and agency is, I contend, misconceived as a 
metaphysical, or ontological, problem. The problem of structure and agency is part of 
the metaphysical question on the compatibility of free will and determinism, in that 
free will is the species-specific attribute of human agency, and social structure is the 
paramount source of causal determination that impacts on it. But this metaphysical 
question is best addressed in the round via engagement with the leading 
philosophical theories on free will, which I have done. The specifically social 
theoretical problem should then be reconceived in broadly empirical and interpretive 
terms of how, in which ways, and under which circumstances, the social-structural 
conditions of individuals’ action impinge on their ability to act freely. Therefore, what 
is typically taken to be “the problem of structure and agency” simply dissolves. There 
is no one, general, empirical problem to solve either. There are, rather, a manifold 
variety of social conditions, forces, pressures, influences etc. that can and do 
present obstacles to agents engaging their deliberative faculties, set the kind and 
range of possible actions from which they choose, and affect the difficulty of 
exercising their preferred choices. It is precisely the raison d’être of the social 
sciences to investigate these sources and modes of social-structural causation. 
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